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1. Introduction 
It is widely agreed that the present system of international payments is no longer viable, and that 
a reform is needed, to address the problem of a new international reserve currency. Yet, the 
terms of the problem are blurred, and it is often unclear whether it should be investigated from a 
political or a scientific point of view. The aim of this paper is to show that a reform is overdue 
for scientific reasons: namely to replace the present non-system of international payments with a 
system respectful of the principles of money and banking.  
 
In the second section we will present a brief analysis of the way domestic payment systems work 
based on the distinction between monetary and financial intermediation. We investigate the 
nature and role of money, and show what conditions are to be fulfilled for a homogeneous 
national payment system to exist. In the third section of the paper we address the need  to extend 
at the international level a similar homogeneous system of payments. After a critical assessment 
of the present non-system for international payments, we propose an interpretation of the plan 
presented by Keynes at Bretton Woods based on Schmitt’s monetary analysis (Schmitt 1973, 
1985, 1988). In particular, we will claim that, though it rested on the principles of banking, the 
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Keynes Plan did not distinguish clearly enough the monetary from the financial intermediation, 
which is the main reason why it failed as a valid alterna tive to Withe’s plan.  
 
What the world needs is a system providing both a common numerical standard, and a 
mechanism for the final settlement of international transactions. Both the monetary and the 
financial problems have to be solved, a task that requires a reform reconciling the vehicular 
function of money with the liberatory character of final payments. In the last section of the paper 
we will summarise the leading principles of such a reform, and show how it could be 
implemented in stages, starting from a group of countries to end with all of them.  
 
2. Money and banks 
No one will dispute the fact that in all economies money is bank money. A lesser known, equally 
undisputable fact is that bank money is issued by every bank operating within a national 
monetary system. It is still widely believed that national money can be issued only by a country’s 
central bank. This is not so. Central banks are the sole institutions entitled to issue banknotes, it 
is true, but they have no direct control over commercial or private banks deposits, which are 
unanimously considered as by far the most important component of the money supply. Money 
has its origin in the faculty of banks to use double-entry bookkeeping in order to issue their own 
acknowledgments of debt (their own IOUs – I owe you). The role of central banks is essential, 
but it relates to the need to transform the IOUs issued by each private and commercial bank into 
homogeneous units of a unique system, and we will deal with it in the fourth section of the paper. 
In this section we are concerned with the nature of bank money as issued by banks, and with its 




What does it mean for a bank to issue money as its own acknowledgment of debt by using 
double-entry bookkeeping? The technical answer is that the bank enters a given number of units 
of account on its assets and its liabilities sides to the benefit of a client. In practice, this 
corresponds to the opening of a line of credit. No transaction has yet occurred, and no payment 
has been carried out by our bank. As a matter of fact, no money units have been created yet, 
since the result of the bank’s double entry is zero. However, it would be mistaken to think that 
the meaning of this entry is nil. Zero is a number, to wit the first number of the series of integers, 
and double-entry bookkeeping allows to introduce it into economics as the result of a positive 
and negative entry of the same amount. Finally, it is the discovery of positive and negative 
numbers, and their introduction into economics, that accounts for the origin of bank money. 
 
The idea that bank money is essentially numerical should not be surprising, and is perfectly in 
line with the fact that neither individuals, nor their institutions can issue it as a positive asset. It is 
therefore immediately clear that money as such must be kept analytically separate from money 
income. By opening a line of credit, a bank simply tells its clients that it is able and  ready to 
carry out a payment on their behalf if they can have access (directly or indirectly) to the money 
income required to finance it. Here it is important to understand that income is created by 
production, and not by credit. If no production occurs, no lending can be carried out by banks 
(Schmitt 1975, 1984a, Cencini 1988, 1997, 2001a, 2005, Rossi 2001, 2003, 2007, 2009b). The 
first transaction allowing for the creation of money is also the one which gives rise to a positive 




Let us consider the payment of wages for an amount of x money units carried out by bank B on 
behalf of its client F. Activating its client’s line of credit, the bank enters workers W on the 
liabilities side of its balance sheet, and firm F on the assets side. As a result, W becomes the 
owner of a positive amount of income deposited with B, and F is indebted to B. The object of 
W’s credit with the bank is the income formed at the moment wages are paid, which is also the 
object of F’s debt to the bank. And what is the object of income, and by what is it defined? The 
answer to both questions is straightforward: produced output. Through the payment of wages an 
absolute exchange occurs, which transforms real output into money income, i.e. which identifies 
income with output (Schmitt 1984a). As for money, it is created and destroyed at the very 
moment wages are paid. 
 
Banks issue or create money with each payment, and money is immediately destroyed at the end 
of each payment. Since payments are logically instantaneous, money disappears as soon as it is 
created, leaving room for positive and negative bank deposits defining the formation, transfer or 
destruction of income. The role of money is twofold: it provides a numerical expression for 
produced output, and vehiculates economic payments (Schmitt 1984a, Cencini 2001a, 2003, 
2005, Rossi 2001, 2006, 2007). In its first function, money is a numerical form, and produced 
output is its real content, whereas, as a means of payment, money vehiculates income from 
clients to banks and vice versa. In our example, x money units are the numerical form of output, 
their numerical measure, as opposed to a dimensional standard of a hypothetical (and 
metaphysical) economic substance. At the same time x money units enable the payment of wages 




Fundamentally, banks act as intermediaries. They also operate as firms, of course, but this is not 
what interests us here. To better understand the distinction between money and income it is 
worth making clear the doub le process of intermediation carried out by banks. 
 
3. Monetary and financial intermediations  
In order for economics to exist as a science it needs to have a specific and measurable object. As 
unanimously recognized, this object is produced output, and money is a necessary element to 
grant for its numerical expression. Without money, output would simply amount to a heap of 
physically heterogeneous objects, and would therefore remain totally undetermined. The 
difficulty here is to realize that in economics the unit of measure is both numerical and real even 
though money is purely numerical. Since Walras (1984/1874) it is well known that economic 
value is not a substance, which implies that the value of output cannot be determined by 
comparing it to the value of a given standard. We cannot express economic value by using a 
physical measuring rod. If economic value were a substance, money would have to be made up 
of the same substance as produced output. Since this is not the case, money has to be thought of 
as a numerical form that gives output its numerical expression when one (output) becomes the 
real content of the other (money). Money is a necessary element for economics to have its own 
measurement standard; the other necessary element is output (Schmitt 1984a, Cencini 2001a, 
2005, 2008, Rossi 2003, 2007). Numbers alone are not enough; they must be closely associated 
with produced output so that numerical form and real content become a unity. This is what 
happens when wages are paid out. The unity of money and output gives thus rise to the economic 




In economics we do not have output on one side, and a measurement standard on the other side, 
but a unique object resulting from the integration between money and physical output. The 
presence of money is a necessary condition for the object of economics to exist in its numerical 
form. Issued by banks as an asset- liability (Schmitt 1966), money is subject to their 
intermediation. This claim requires some further explanation. 
 
Since the vast majority of economists (for example Friedman, Clower, Johnson, Sayers, 
Goodhart, Graziani, Moore, Parguez, Wray) do not distinguish between money and income, the 
intermediation of banks is mostly identified with their interventions as financial intermediaries. 
The existence of money as such is still somehow mysterious, and so is the idea that banks act as 
monetary intermediaries. Yet, double-entry bookkeeping is there to show that payments imply 
the presence of money as a flow. When bank B pays agent C on behalf of agent A, both A and C 
are simultaneously debited and credited by B. Correctly understood, double-entry bookkeeping 
entails the debiting and crediting of each economic agent taking part in a transaction, and not the 
simple debiting of one agent and crediting of another. In our example this means that money is 
created and destroyed for A as well as for C. The bank issues money every time a payment is 
carried out, and it does so by debiting and crediting both the payer and the payee. Hence, money 
is never in the possession of any economic agent: it flows from the bank to A, from A to C, and 
from C back to B. A circular flow is what best defines bank money, which clearly shows that 
such old physical concepts as mass, quantity and velocity are inappropriate to describe it. There 
is no such thing as a ‘mass’ of money, and it is ingenuous to believe that money can circulate at a 
certain speed. The numerical nature of bank money and the necessary compliance with the 
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principle of double-entry bookkeeping leave no room for dispute: money is a simple flow 
facilitating transactions ; it is a means of payment, and not its object or real content. 
 
The monetary intermediation of banks consists in providing the economy with the money flow 
required to convey payments. Banks use double-entry bookkeeping as the specific technique 
eliciting a flow of money through a succession of creations and destructions (Schmitt 1984a, 
Cencini 2001a, 2005, Rossi 2007, 2009b). This is not enough, however, for payments to be 
redeemable. A financial intermediation is also needed, in order for money to convey a real object 
from the payer to the payee. This cannot be done by banks alone. When it acts as an 
intermediary, a bank can create neither income nor credit. As we have known at least since the 
work of the Classics (such as Smith 1776/1991, Ricardo 1817/1951, 1951-5, Marx 1867-
1894/1976-1981), it is production that gives rise to income. Now, as soon as it is created, income 
is deposited with banks. This is necessarily so, since income results from the association of 
produced output with money, and money flows immediately back to the bank by which it is 
issued. In compliance with the principle of double-entry bookkeeping, all deposits with banks are 
immediately lent. This is precisely what the necessary equality between debits and credits 
implies. The entry of a deposit on the liabilities side of a bank’s balance sheet defines its debit to 
the depositor, and it is matched by an equivalent entry on the assets side, which defines its credit 
on the economic agent who benefits from the loan of the income deposited. From the moment 
income is formed, banks are involved as financial intermediaries. 
 






Firm F x Wage earners x 
 
As beneficiaries of the payment, wage earners are credited by the paying bank. The object of 
wage earners’ credit on the bank is the income deposited with it. In other words, wage earners 
lend their income to the bank as soon as it is formed, and become the owners of a claim on the 
bank (a certificate of deposit). The entry of wage earners on the liabilities side of the bank’s 
balance sheet is matched by the entry of firm F on the assets side. In fact, wages are paid on 
behalf of F, which becomes indebted to the bank. But what is the object of F’s debt to the bank? 
What has F received from B? The answer is straight: the very same income deposited by wage 
earners. Bank B is a mere intermediary, it gets an income from wage earners and gives it to the 
firm. The income formed by production is instantaneously deposited with the banking system 
and lent to firms, which spend it on the (initial) purchase of output, i.e. a transaction that leads to 
the formation of a stock, and is an investment.  
 
The payment of wages is only one example of banks’ financial intermediation. As a matter of 
fact, banks carry out a financial intermediation (as well as a monetary one) each time a payment 
occurs. Hence, when A asks its bank B to pay C, the bank debits A and credits C with the same 
amount of income. To be precise, B does much more than that: it credits and debits A and C. If 
B simply balanced A’s debit with C’s credit, it would not comply with the logical requirements 
of double-entry bookkeeping: each entry would be simple and not double. In reality, this is not 
the case, since in order to pay C the bank has first to credit A with a positive amount of income 
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(previously deposited by A or by somebody else), and then debit him/her with the same amount. 
Analogously, B credits C with the income paid by A, and immediately debits the same (C), since 
the income is deposited with the bank at once. Finally, A either balances his position (if he pays 
C with his deposits) or incurs a debt to the bank (if B lends him the deposit of some other client), 
and C either increases his deposits with B or compensates a previous debt with the bank.  
 
At this stage it would be redundant to consider other examples of financial intermediation, for 
they could all be brought back to the ones we have just analysed. Let us just emphasise the fact 
that banks’ monetary and financial intermediations obey the laws of double-entry bookkeeping, 
and represent the building blocks of our systems of payments (Moore 1988, Deleplace and Nell 
1996, Parguez and Seccareccia 2000, Graziani 2003, Rossi 2007). Both intermediations are 
present in every payment, a fact that has to be clearly recognised if one wants to understand the 
logical structure of a monetary system. Today too many economists still mix up money and 
income, and are thus led to confuse the monetary with the financial intermediation of banks. 
Most of the time, no distinction is drawn between the emission of money and the granting of 
credit, and it is claimed that banks grant credit by issuing money, as if they could issue money as 
a net asset. This is a widespread mistake that has its origin in the concept of commodity-money, 
and which shows how little we know about the nature of bank money. An important progress 
was made by Schmitt (1960, 1966, 1975), but his definition of bank money as an asset-liability is 
still poorly known. Nor have economists sufficiently considered the logical impossibility for 
banks (or any other institution) to create monetary or financial assets. Most likely, economists 
are misled into identifying money and credit by the fact that a monetary intermediation is always 
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accompanied by a financial intermediation (Schmitt 1984a, Gnos 1998, 2003, Cencini 1997, 
2005, 2008, Rossi 2007, 2009b). For example, when wages are paid, the bank carrying out the 
payment lends to F the income deposited by wage earners, so that it is correct to say that F 
benefits from a credit granted by B. Yet, this does not mean that B grants a credit to F by issuing 
money. The origin of the credit is the income formed through production and deposited with B.  
 
The emission of money is required for payments to be conveyed from payer to payee, while the 
presence of income is necessary for payments to have a real content. Every payment implies a 
circuit of money and a circuit of income, and banks are there to grant for the existence of these 
two circuits through their monetary and financial intermediations.  
 
4. The national payment system 
Since money is issued by banks as their spontaneous acknowledgment of debt, a problem arises 
as to the heterogeneity of each bank’s IOU. In order for a unique, national monetary system to 
exist, the monies issued by each single bank must be made homogeneous. This is done through a 
system of inter-bank settlement, usually operated by the central bank.  
 
When a client of bank B1 pays a client of another bank B2, B1 does not pay B2 directly, because 
if it did B2 would be paid by B1’s acknowledgment of debt, while it should be clear that nobody 
pays by getting indebted. The non-payment is avoided by the central bank, which pays B2 on 
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behalf of B1. The central bank acts as a catalyst through which the monies issued by commercial 
banks are made homogeneous, i.e. they are given the form of central or national money. Central 
banks are not the initial issuers of money, yet their presence as settlement institutions for any 
transaction on the interbank market is crucial, since it is through their intermediation that a 
homogeneous monetary space can exist at the national level.  
 
Today’s system of inter-bank payments is a real-time gross settlement system, which implies that 
each payment carried out by the central bank on behalf of commercial banks must be settled at 
the very moment it takes place. This is perfectly in line with the law of the logical identity 
between each single agent’s sales and purchases derived by Schmitt (1975) from the vehicular 
nature of bank money. According to this law, when a given agent acts as a purchaser, he also 
necessarily acts as a seller, and vice versa, which is simply another way of saying that he cannot 
be debited without being credited, and vice versa. Apparently absurd, Schmitt’s law becomes 
clear as soon as it is specified that the identity between sales and purchases is verified on the 
labour, financial and output markets taken as a whole. Hence, wage earners are sellers on the 
labour market and purchasers (of certificates of deposit) on the financial market, while firms are 
purchasers on the labour market and sellers (of bonds) on the financial market. Likewise, 
consumers sell bonds or certificates of deposit and purchase output, whereas firms sell output 
and purchase certificates of deposit. By acting as a settlement institution, the central bank applies 
this princip le to commercial banks, asking each of them to compensate its payments (purchases 
of goods, services and financial claims) with equivalent receipts (sales of goods, services and 
financial claims). Finally, while commercial banks act as monetary and financial intermediaries 
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on behalf of their clients, the central bank acts as a monetary and financial intermediary with 
respect to commercial banks: it issues the (central) money required to convey inter-bank 
payments, and it makes sure that payments are settled through compensation (clearing). 
 
It is now time to turn our attention to the international system of payments. 
 
5. The present non-system of international payments 
Today, payments between nations are carried out in one or more national currencies, and without 
the help of any international settlement system. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that the lack 
of a true system of international payments is the cause of serious disturbances that hamper the 
development of both developed and developing countries. Two closely related considerations are 
enough to show why the decisions taken at Bretton Woods gave rise to a non-system of 
international payments. The first is that, since they are issued by different national banking 
systems, national monies are heterogeneous. The second is that each national money defines the 
acknowledgment of debt of the banking system that issues it. If heterogeneity is not dealt with, it 
is impossible to speak of a ‘system’, and an acknowledgment of debt can never be the object of a 
payment. Without the presence of a common standard, and without a mechanism ensuring that 
payments have a real content, no system of international payments can ever exist. If country A 
pays country C in money A neither of these two requirements is sat isfied. What C gets in 
exchange for its real exports is a mere acknowledgment of debt, a promise that is erroneously 
taken to define a net asset. So much so that today money A is entered on the assets side of C’s 
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banking system, which issues, as a balancing item, an equivalent amount of money C. Two 
mistakes are made in this regard: a simple amount of money is identified with an asset, and an 
inflationary emission of money is elicited in country C (Schmitt 1984b). 
 
Even though the non-payment of country A is matched by the non-payment of country C when 
trade is balanced, the disorder caused by the use of national monies as international means and 
objects of payment cannot be reabsorbed. In both A and C an inflationary gap appears, which is 
the mark of their reciprocal non-payments. Internationally originated inflation takes a particular 
form when country A runs up a trade deficit and its national money is a reserve currency. In this 
case A’s payment leads to a duplication, which increases the amount of financ ial capital held in 
the creditor countries without curtailing A’s financial deposits. Originally pointed out by Rueff 
(1963), the phenomenon of duplication explains the origin of euro-currencies, and is a key 
element for the understanding of the pathological capital formed internationally and feeding 
financial speculation (Schmitt 1984b, Cencini 2001a).  
 
In the absence of a true system of international payments, transactions between nations are 
settled in money (Schmitt 1985). Apparently, there is nothing wrong with this consideration. Yet, 
it must be remembered that money is not identical with income. Within every national economy, 
payments are conveyed by money, yet their redeeming power is not given by money itself. It is 
income that, by identifying itself with produced output, makes up for the final payment. In an 
orderly-working system of payments, money would always convey income, and there would be 
no reason to worry about the risk of money alone being the content or the object of a payment. 
However, nowadays the world operates otherwise. If we consider international payments only, it 
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is immediately clear that money is dealt with as if its nature could drastically change by shifting 
from a national to an international context. Instead of considering it as a numerical form or 
vehicle of no intrinsic value, money is seen as a kind of commodity, an asset that can be bought 
and sold, and which has a price (Aizenman and Lee 2007, Bordo and James 2008, Caballero et 
al. 2008, Dooley et al. 2009). Very few economists seem to realise that money is required for 
prices to be numerically expressed, and cannot, itself, have a price. Can we really think that by 
moving from a national to the international level money is transformed from a simple numerical 
form into an object of exchange? This drastic change in nature should appear all the more absurd 
that outside its national boundaries money is no longer related to income. When a sum of money 
A enters the banking system of country C, not even a fraction of A’s income leaves its banks. 
The total of A’s income is deposited within its banking system, which is precisely why the 
money A entered by C’s banks is nothing other than a mere acknowledgment of debt. 
 
Another serious disorder caused by the present non-system of international payments concerns 
the payment of net interests on debt by less developed countries (LDCs). A scientific 
breakthrough shows that indebted LDCs are bound to pay twice their net interests on external 
debt: the payment of interests equal to x has a total cost of 2x (Cencini and Schmitt 1991, 
Schmitt 2006). As absurd as it might appear, today’s non-system of international payments 
multiplies by two the burden of net interests. This is so, because the payment carried out by the 
indebted residents (State included) has to be conveyed to the creditor countries. Since no system 
of international payments exists that can provide at zero cost the international money required to 
convey this payment, indebted countries must sacrifice part of their national resources to find the 
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foreign currencies needed to vehiculate the payment of their residents in the international 
monetary ‘space’.  
 
The simplest proof of the double payment of net interests given by Schmitt (2009) goes as 
follows. We start from the balance of payments identity EX = IM, where EX and IM represent 
the total exports and the total imports of goods, services and financial claims of the indebted 
country, B. The payment of net interests (in) increases B’s foreign exchange expenditures, which 
are now equal to IM + in. Since the increase in B’s expenditures is not matched by an equivalent 
increase in its purchases (in is a net transfer entered into B’s current account), the in sum paid by 
B pays for an equivalent part of the total imports of the creditor countries, R and decreases B’s 
receipts. Alltogether, B’s foreign exchange expenditures amount to IM + in, while its receipts are 
equal to EX – in. The decrease in B’s receipts is the direct effect of the increase in its 
expenditures owing to the payment of in. The total gap created by the payment of in is therefore 
twice the amount due to B’s creditors.  
 
It is important to observe that B’s indebted residents pay only once, and that R’s residents are 
also paid only once. The second payment of in concerns the indebted country considered as a 
whole. It is B’s macroeconomy that suffers from the loss of resources caused by the second 
payment, and it is R’s macroeconomy that benefits from it. Official statistics published by the 
World Bank confirm that, from 1976 to 2007, the official reserves of indebted countries suffered 





6. The need for an international money 
The use of one or more national currencies as international monies is inconsistent with the need 
to create a homogeneous monetary system of international payments. The inherent heterogeneity 
of national currencies can be dealt with only by reducing them to a common standard. This is the 
first task of a true international money: to provide for an international standard issued according 
to the principles of banking.  
 
In his plan of reform presented at Bretton Woods in 1944, John Maynard Keynes advocated the 
creation of an International Clearing Union (ICU) and the use of an international money called 
bancor issued by the ICU. Keynes refers explicitly to the rule of double-entry bookkeeping: 
‘[t]he idea underlying such a Union is simple, namely, to generalise the essential principle of 
banking as it is exhibited within any closed system. This principle is the necessary equality of 
debits and credits’ (Keynes 1980 : 171). As a matter of fact, Keynes’s plan is not entirely 
consistent with the principle of double-entry bookkeeping, since it rests on the idea that, in order 
to satisfy the necessary equality of debits and credits, it is enough for the ICU to balance its 
credits in bancor on one country with its debits in bancor to another country. Yet, this is not what 
the principle of double-entry bookkeeping stands for. What is required is the necessary balancing 
of each country’s debits and credits, a condition implying the circular use of money. Keynes 
erroneously believed that international payments could have been settled in bancor, which 
explains why his plan was rejected in favour of White’s plan. If the bancor was to be considered 
as any other national currency, then why not use straightaway the currency of the richest and 
most powerful country in the world? Replacing the US dollar with another currency is no radical 
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change, and does not represent a viable alternative unless the bancor is conceived and used as a 
circular means of payment. 
 
Keynes’s plan would have been up to its task if it had advocated the need for an international 
money issued by the ICU by simultaneously crediting and debiting every country involved in an 
international payment. As in any national system, the role of money is to convey payments, and 
not to make up for their final settlement. Keynes implicitly recognised that the bancor would 
have been issued as the ICU’s spontaneous acknowledgment of debt. This should have taught 
him that, as such, the bancor could never have been the object of international payments. 
 
In the same way as national payments between banks cannot be settled directly, payments 
between nations require the use of a money of a higher degree (Schmitt 1975, Cencini and 
Schmitt 1991, 1992, Cencini 2005, Rossi 2007). If bank A were to pay bank C directly by 
crediting it with money A (the acknowledgment of debt issued by bank A), the payment would 
be aborted, since nobody pays by getting indebted. This is one of the reasons why the payment is 
carried out by the central bank, in central bank money, on behalf of bank A. The other reason is 
that, without the intervention of the central bank, money A and money C would remain 
heterogeneous. The central bank acts as a catalyst and gives the common form of central bank 
money to the monies issued by any commercial bank  operating within a national system. An 
analogous process must take place internationally: national currencies must be made 




To provide the world with an international money playing the role of the common standard of 
national currencies is the first undertak ing of a reform allowing for the creation of an orderly 
system of international payments. Yet, this will not be enough. An international money is 
required to convey payments between nations, but cannot be itself the object of payments. It is 
thus necessary to explain how, through the circular use of the international money, payments can 
be settled in real terms.  
 
7. The financial problem 
Within any domestic system, payments are effective if the payee is credited with a sum of money 
associated with current output, i.e. with a sum of income. If money had no real content, it would 
convey no payment, and its use as an object of payment would be a cause of disorder. Money is a 
necessary, yet not a sufficient element for payments to be carried out. Banks create money, but 
they cannot create its purchasing power, which results from its association with produced output. 
At the outset, the financial problem consists in providing for the purchasing power of money. 
Nationally, this is done by production. What the payee gets in exchange for its sales of goods, 
services and/or financial claims is a sum of money-income defining part of current output. 
Internationally, however, no production takes place, and there is no output that can endow an 
international money with a positive purchasing power (multinational production takes place in 
various countries and is not truly inter-national). How are we to deal, then, with the financial 
problem at the international level? 
 
Here a hasty reader might be tempted to advocate the use of a national currency as international 
money. Yet, this is far from being a correct solution since a national currency, which acquires its 
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value from its association with domestic output, conveys final payments only within its national 
borders. Outside these borders, a national currency is just an acknowledgment of debt, and, as 
such, it cannot finance any final payment. To base the bancor on deposits of gold and foreign 
exchange constituted  with the ICU is no solution, since it amounts to define the bancor as a mix 
of commodity-money and national currencies. As is widely recognised, gold is of no use to bank 
money, whose value is no longer thought to be derived from it, and the bancor would not be 
substantially different from a national currency if it were to depend on foreign exchange. 
 
Now, Keynes clearly stated that the bancor was to be kept distinct from national currencies, and 
that it had to be issued as a bank money. If the bancor has no intrinsic value, and if it cannot be 
associated with any international production, where does it derive its redeeming power from? 
How can it have any purchasing power at all? Keynes did not provide a straight answer to these 
questions. Yet, his choice to name the new international bank International Clearing Union, as 
well as his emphasis on the need for a multilateral settlement system, helps us to solve the 
financial problem satisfactorily. 
 
In the same way as inter-bank payments are conveyed by central bank money, international 
payments will be conveyed by the international money issued by the world’s central bank acting 
as an international settlement institution. Likewise, the purchasing power of international 
payments will be granted by a mechanism of multilateral clearing similar to that operated 
nationally by central banks. The principle to be applied here is that of the necessary equality 
between each agent’s sales and purchases. What is true for any domestic agent is also valid for 
countries. Internationally, each country is a single agent, and it is subject to the same law 
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applying nationally to each economic agent. The mechanism of international settlement will be 
the means through which this law will be enforced. Hence, a country will be able to pay only to 
the extent that it is itself paid by other countries. This can be illustrated by means of a simplified 
example concerning two countries only, A and C. In this particular case, the principle discovered 
by Schmitt (1975) establishes that A can purchase from C only if C purchases from A. The 
equality between A’s sales and C’s purchases, and between A’s purchases and C’s sales is a 
tautology. The equality between A’s sales and A’s purchases, and between C’s purchases and 
C’s sales is a law. A mechanism of clearing (bilateral in our example) based on a gross real-time 
settlement system will ensure that this law will be respected. According to this system (already 
widely applied within countries), the world central bank will pay C on behalf of A as soon as A 
benefits itself from an equivalent payment.  
 
A’s debits and credits with the world central bank must balance, and so must C’s credits and 
debits. This does not mean, however, that country A (C) must balance commercial imports with 
commercial exports. A balanced current account is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition 
for country A’s credits to match country A’s debits. The equality between A’s (C’s) sales and 
purchases must be verified on financial and product markets taken together, and not on each of 
them separately. In our example, country A may well run a trade deficit and balance its net 
purchases of goods and services with a net sale of financial claims. If this is the case, A’s trade 
deficit is financed by C through its purchase of A’s financial claims. The simultaneity of A’s and 
C’s purchases and sales shows that, in this particular case, it is thanks to C’s investment s that A 
covers the cost of its net commercia l imports. In general, the real-time gross settlement system 
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will allow countries to find in their sales of goods, services and financial claims the real 
financing of their purchases on the output and financial markets.  
 
8. Proposals for a solution 
The requirements necessary for a sound system of international payments to see the light are as 
follows. 
1. The creation of an international money in compliance with the principle of double-entry 
bookkeeping.  
2. The use of this money as a circular means to convey payments between nations.  
3. The bookkeeping distinction between the world central bank’s monetary and financial 
intermediations. 
4. The distinction between each country’s monetary and financial accounts. 
5. The implementation of an international multilateral settlement system consistent with the 
need to respect the necessary equality between each country’s sales and purchases. 
 
It is worth observing that the circular use of the new international money will impede its 
transformation into an object of exchange, and permit the passage from today’s regime of erratic 
exchange rate fluctuations to a system of stable exchange rates. In the present non-system of 
international payment, currencies are considered as if they were goods or assets, and their 
exchange rates are assimilated to relative prices determined through the adjustment of supply and 
demand as is supposed to take place on the foreign exchange market. In the new system, neither 
the existing national currencies, nor the new international money will be transformed into 
tradable goods. This will be so because in every international payment each country will be 
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simultaneously credited and debited both in national and in international money. National 
currencies will no longer be subject to a process of duplication (Rueff 1963, 1980, Schmitt 
1984a, Cencini 2001), and, being created and destroyed in each payment, the new international 
money will not circulate on the foreign exchange market. As for the new regime of exchange 
rates, defined by Schmitt (1984b) as a system of absolute exchange rates, it should be clear that 
its stability will be granted by the necessary balancing of the world central bank’s monetary 
account. Using the traditional terms of supply and demand we could say that, because of the 
circular use of international money, in each payment between countries every national currency 
will be simultaneously supplied and demanded in terms of the new international money, and vice 
versa. The immediate balancing of supply and demand leaves no room for any adjustment, and 
guarantees the stability of the new exchange rates regime.  
 
As a matter of fact, in an orderly system of payments money would immediately be replaced by 
real goods, services or financial assets, its intermediation lasting a mere instant. This means that 
the reform advocated in this paper could be implemented without the need for the creation of a 
new international money. What really matters is that no money is used as a positive asset. If the 
new system is apt to grant for payments to have a real content, then any national or international 
money can play the role of unit of account and means of payment. The implementation of a 
system of double-entry bookkeeping between nations is what is needed to guarantee the neutral 
use of money at the international level. Such a system would withdraw national monies from the 
realm of real goods, and make certain that they will no longer be exchanged for one another on 
the foreign exchange market. The stability of exchange rates will make it perfectly conceivable 
to use national monies as units of account of international payments (Cencini and Schmitt 2010). 
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The creation of a true international money would be preferable from a formal point of view, of 
course, yet it is by no means a necessary condition for the reform to work. If, for any reason, 
agreement on a new international standard proved too difficult, the impasse could easily be 
avoided by allowing for the double-entry (or circular) use of national currencies. 
 
The constitution of a world central bank responsible for issuing an international money and the 
implementation of a mechanism of multilateral clearing based on a real-time gross settlement 
protocol would require general agreement among nations about the need for a radical reform of 
the present system of international payments. This could pass through the call for a new Bretton 
Woods Conference where countries would be asked to definitively give up the use of the US 
dollar or that of any other national currency as international reserve asset. Put in these terms, the 
solution is most likely to be opposed by the US, and even by the EU. It is a fact that, since the 
early 1950s, the US has almost always run a conspicuous trade deficit, which it has paid by 
crediting the exporting countries in dollars. This has permitted the US to pay for its net purchases 
of foreign goods and services simply by transferring its own acknowledgment of debt. As 
already claimed by Rueff (1963, 1980), the dollars thus paid never abandon the US banking 
system, where they remain necessarily deposited, which clearly explains how it has been 
possible for US domestic demand to be maintained at the levels observed over the last sixty 
years. Part of the dollars entered as assets in the credito r countries’ banking systems is invested 
in the US (through the purchase of Treasury bills, securities, or other financial claims), thus 
giving a real content to the US payment of their net commercial imports. Yet, another part is not 
converted into US financial claims, and defines the amount of commercial imports that remains 
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unpaid. Why should the US (or the EU in a foreseable future) give up the privilege of buying 
without paying? 
 
The answer to this question is rather simple and rests on the observation that an orderly system 
of payments will benefit even those countr ies that have been less hit by the present disorder. A 
world in which indebted countries are getting poorer, and exchanges are jeopardised by the debt 
crisis and the monetary anomalies resulting from the partial non-payment of net commercial 
exports is not propitious to economic growth. Growth in industrialised countries is highly 
dependent on that of their counterpart ies, and a monetary system allowing for a substantial 
increase in foreign trade is clearly preferable to one hampering international transactions. 
Further, it is absurd that such a powerful and developed country as the US keeps running up an 
extensive trade deficit. Logic requires order, and an orderly system will see an inversion in the 
US trade balance. 
 
Technically speaking, the reform of the international payment system would require: 
- the institution of a world central bank acting as an international settlement institution; 
- the distinction between two departments within each national central bank: one dealing 
with the country’s commercial banks, and the other dealing with the world central bank; 
- the implementation of a real-time gross settlement system of multilateral clearing 
administered by the world central bank; 
 
The reform advocated here could also be implemented in stages (Cencini 2001b, 2005, 2008). In 
a first phase, it could be adopted only by a restricted number of neighbouring countries sharing 
26 
 
economic interest s. For example, a group of Asian countries could create a regional central bank 
whose task would be to issue a money used to convey payments between them, and to run a 
system of multilateral clearing. Each country would carry on using its national money within its 
national boundaries, thus preserving its monetary sovereignty. The new common currency would 
not circulate nationally, and would not be available on the foreign exchange market. If the rest of 
the world did not follow the example of these Asian countries, this would not be enough to 
guarantee total stability to their exchange rates. Yet, exchange rates stability would be greatly 
increased (it would be total between the currencies of the countries adopting the new system), 
and so would internal mone tary stability as well as trade. 
 
It is easy to foresee that these benefits would soon encourage other sets of countries to 
implement the same structure of payments. A plausible scenario  could therefore be represented 
by a series of ‘monetary areas’, each having its own common currency and its own central bank, 
and whose reciprocal payments would be carried out by a world central bank using an inter-
regional supra-national money. For example, we could have the Asian, the American, the 
African and the European areas. Payments between the countries of each area would be made in 
the Asian, the American, the African and the European supra-national monies, while payments 




Today’s financial and economic crises are a clear symptom of the disarray of a system of 
payments that has its origin in the Conference of Genoa (1922), and is based on the use of one or 
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more national currencies as international reserve assets. Time has come to re-think the very 
foundations of the system of international payments. The reform advocated here is basically the 
same as the one proposed by Schmitt back in 1973. It calls for the institution of a world central 
bank designed to provide monetary stability without forcing countries to give up monetary 
sovereignty, and without the need for any kind of intervention on the foreign exchange market or 
on interest rates. 
 
Let us conclude with an example of how payments are channelled in the new system. Suppose 
that a resident of country A (RA) asks her/his bank to carry out a payment on her/his behalf to 
the benefit of a resident of country B. The commercial bank of RA debits her/his account, and 
conveys the payment to country A’s central bank. Once credited by RA’s commercial bank, the 
central bank of country A asks the world central bank (WCB) to credit the central bank of 
country B. According to the principle of real-time gross settlements, the WCB carries out the 
payment to the benefit of B’s central bank as soon as the account of A’s central bank is credited 
with an equivalent amount. As the international settlement system run by the WCB is 
multilateral, this will occur when the residents of another country, C, ask their bank to pay, via 
C’s central bank and the WCB, for their imports of A’s commercial goods, services and/or 
financial assets. The implementation of an international settlement system run by the WCB 
ensures that the payments of A have a real content (the purchase of commercial goods and 
services is balanced by an equal sale of goods, services and/or financial assets). It also 
guarantees the vehicular use of the money chosen as international means of payment and issued 
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